Hire Joe Morgan: There Really Is A "Closer's Mentality"

So you know this whole "closer's mentality" thing. About how certain pitchers have the mental makeup to survive the rigors of pitching with the game on the line.

If you haven't heard this, sit next to Dave Valle for five minutes--he'll tell you about it.

I've always thought this was bullshit.

I thought it was bullshit before the Red Sox announced they'd go into the 2003 season with no established closer, and I thought it was bullshit after that experiment was a complete disaster.

I still thought it was bullshit when the Oakland A's decided to make longtime setup man Arthur Rhodes, who'd averaged a .98 WHIP over the previous three seasons, their closer in 2004, and I thought it was bullshit after Rhodes' WHIP ballooned to 1.71 in that role before A's gave up on using him as a closer in mid-June.

But after Sunday's game, I don't think it's bullshit anymore.

Mark Lowe, who's got straight nasty stuff, came on in the ninth inning, with a four-run lead, facing some of the worst hitters in baseball. And he couldn't throw a strike. Lowe's had three meaningful ninth-inning appearances since J.J. Putz went down (no, I'm not counting the game against the Royals when he got two outs with the team up five runs). In those meaningful appearances, Lowe has allowed seven baserunners, four runs, and recorded an ERA of 15.88. As Ron Fairly would say, "a little higher than you'd like."

Ryan Rowland-Smith, meanwhile, has pitched 1.1 of such innings. He hasn't allowed a baserunner and has struck out three guys.

Small sample size? Yes, of course. Of course it is. Unfair to Lowe to conclude that Rowland-Smith's a better pitcher.

But here's something that's unfair to Rowland-Smith--Lowe has a better arm.

Mark Lowe can get the ball to the plate in the mid-90s, and he has a hard, high-80s slider. Rowland-Smith is lucky to touch 90 with his fastball, and 80 with his breaking pitch.

By any logical assessment, Lowe should be the better closer. But, so far, Rowland-Smith is.

Maybe Rowland-Smith can continue in the tradition of soft-tossing lefties who've been tremendous closers--John Franco, 4th all-time in saves, and Eddie Guardado, twice an all-star. Those guys were said to have the "closer's mentality." Maybe Rowland-Smith has it too.

This whole "mentality" issue all plays into a larger argument about how to use the 25-men on a baseball team.

One on hand, you have those who believe that baseball players ought to be treated with extreme deference to their mental makeup. That you don't bench your starters, lest they "lose confidence." That you give players a specific task on the team, so they "know their role." This mentality is best exemplified locally by Valle, but also to a certain extent by Geoff Baker of the Times, who argued last year that benching Raul Ibanez for Adam Jones might set off a clubhouse mutiny. (Can't find a link--hope I'm representing that position correctly.)

On the other hand, you have people who believe that baseball players ought to be treated with virtually no deference to their mental makeup. That you should substitute players freely based on game situation, whether they be a veteran or a rookie. This mentality is best exemplified locally by Dave Cameron of USS Mariner, who recently argued that the Angels should be pinch-hitting for their all-time franchise leader in hits and RBI, Garret Anderson, when Anderson faces an unfavorable lefty/righty matchup.

Members of group 1 sometimes accuse members of group 2 of "treating players like they were machines." That a player's ego would be damaged if he were taken out. Which is unfair. Garret Anderson is making an eight-figure salary, that should be enough salve for his ego if Mike Scioscia looked at the match-ups and decided to replace him.

I've always tended toward the USS Mariner side of things (although I wouldn't go so far as to lift Garret Anderson in that situation--it would be like the M's pinch-hitting for Edgar Martinez, and I just can't get behind that). The goal is to win games, and with a game on the line, you can't worry about a guy's mental stability.

But maybe that mental stability is a bigger factor than I've been willing to admit. If the Angels pull Anderson, maybe it helps them win one game--but if it gives Anderson a crisis of confidence, it's surely not worth it.

Whether Anderson should have a crisis on confidence is immaterial--as immaterial as whether you should have lifted him to prevent it in the first place--if it affects winning and losing, you must take it into consideration, just as you would the righty/lefty splits.

Players like to know their roles--and that's understandable. Everyone likes to know what they are going to do when they come into work the next day. If you had to go to bed on Tuesday knowing that you were as likely to pitch an idea to an important new client as you were to spend all day figuring out your expense report for last month, you'd probably have a restless night...that, and you'd probably have a tough time deciding whether to down that third beer of the night.

As manager of the 2001 Mets, Bobby Valentine was the subject of constant backbiting by his players because he kept moving the lineup around. His struggling hitters placed blame for their underwhelming performances on Valentine's meddling.

So did the New York media.

At least they did until Valentine pointed out that there was a manager in baseball who'd used even more different lineups than he had--Lou Piniella, then managing the '01 Mariners to a ridonkulous season.

Piniella's one guy who's never had much concern for the mental makeup of his players--I wish I could find this in Retrosheet, but I'm almost sure it happened--I remember him yanking Mike Blowers in the middle of an at bat after Blowers had characteristically swung at two terrible pitches.

Piniella was notoriously not deferential to his players--notably young pitchers, but also Jeff Cirillo, who ascribed his dismal .247 average to Piniella's confrontational style and averred that he'd bounce back with the player-friendly Bob Melvin at the helm in '03. Instead, Cirillo tanked, dropping down to .205 and even down to the minors.

In Cirillo's case, the problem--whatever it was--wasn't solved by extra coddling from his manager. So maybe it didn't matter.

And maybe Lowe's problem isn't that he lacks some sort of closer mentality--maybe he just doesn't have very good command. We'll see. But one thing's for sure--I'll bet he's glad that Lou Piniella wasn't in the M's dugout on Sunday.